The Curse

Pachinko

Pachinko

 

A Talk at Patchogue-Medford Library Long Island NY  July 30, 2015  by Robert H. Steele

Mr. Steele is a Connecticut business executive and former U.S. Congressman, and was a nominee for Governor of Connecticut.

 

Comment by CAGNY editor: This talk starts about  a book set in Connecticut but moves through many important issues about predatory gambling before homing in on a location in New York State now threatened with the imposition of a 1000-device slot parlor.  It is a privilege to present it here.

Thank you for the invitation to come to Patchogue and for your interest in my book, The Curse: Big-Time Gambling’s Seduction of a Small New England Town.

The book is a fact-based novel set against the explosion of casino gambling that hit southeastern CT during the 1990.

The novel begins with the Pequot War in 1637, when Connecticut’s Puritan colonists joined with their Mohegan allies to defeat and almost destroy the Pequots, who were the largest and most warlike of the Connecticut tribes. The story then jumps 350 years, as these two tribes reemerge to build the world’s two biggest casinos – Foxwoods and Mohegan Sun – and a Connecticut family, led by a descendant of one of the Puritan colonists, becomes embroiled in a battle to stop a third casino that threatens the family’s town and ancestral home.

In the end, a small, quintessential New England town faces a Faustian dilemma in which it must choose between preserving its character and values or accepting an enormously seductive offer that would change the town forever.

The Curse, in sum, is a novel based on fact, and this evening I’d like to focus on the factual background of what has occurred in Connecticut and elsewhere – in other words, on the story behind the book.

First, I should probably give you a little more of my background since it entered into my writing the book.

I represented eastern Connecticut in Congress in the 1970s. Then, after running unsuccessfully for governor, I left politics and my family – my wife and four children and I – moved to Ledyard, Connecticut well before anyone dreamed of casinos coming to Connecticut. Those two experiences – knowing Connecticut’s politics as intimately as I did and then living in the midst of the subsequent casino explosion – gave me a front row seat for watching the political maneuverings that led to the casinos and then seeing their impact.

Indian casinos got their start in 1988, when Congress passed the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, which was seen as a means of promoting tribal economic development and self-sufficiency by allowing federally recognized tribes to open casinos on their reservations.

It would be fair to say, however, that Congress had no idea of the Pandora’s Box it was opening when it passed the act.

As it turned out, the law not only opened the door to Indian-owned casinos, but it spurred the legalization of commercial casinos as many states rushed to open casinos as way to raise revenue without directly and overly raising taxes.

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Bad add

Peering over the Edge Flickr CC

Peering over the Edge
Flickr CC

 

The message below was sent by e-mail on the morning of Jan 5, 2015 to Bradley Fischer, Esq.,  Director of Policy, Development and External Affairs, NYS Gaming Commission.

 

 

 

Coalition Against Gambling in New York (CAGNY) urges the Gaming Commission not to heed the Governor’s request to have its Facilities Location Board amend its recommendations announced Dec 17 and open the door to a second casino site in Region 5.

CAGNY believes that a casino cannot net for any region or sub-region the “benefits” touted by the interests that got “Proposition 1” passed in 2013. We believe that none of the three sites recommended on Dec. 17 will if built be anything but a detriment to the people in its locality and to the state. Thus we see no good reason for a second license in Region 5 or any other region. For that matter, we see no good reason for any license anywhere.

Please convey this message as soon as possible to the Chairman and members of the Gaming Commission.

With best wishes for a healthy 2015 for all,

Stephen Q. Shafer, M.D.. M.A., M.P.H..                                                                  Chairperson, Coalition Against Gambling in New York                                                         cell phone 917 453 7371                                                                                                        e-mail sqs1@columbia.edu or shpcount@earthlink.net

Permission is hereby granted to quote the above in full or in part at long as the permalink above is cited.

 

 

Hidden social costs of predatory gambling

 

Under the rug

Under the rug

Statement of Stephen Q, Shafer MD MPH to the Gaming Facility Location Board of the New York State Gaming Commission at the hearing in Poughkeepsie on Sept 23, 2014

My name is Stephen Shafer. A retired physician who now lives in Saugerties, I am Chairperson of Coalition Against Gambling in New York. I was born and brought up in Dutchess County, where my daughter and her family now reside.

Hudson Valley Casino and Resort has presented an analysis of health impacts as incomplete as an analysis of vehicle traffic limited to trucks. The report finds regional health care facilities ready for a slight increase in physical maladies of visitors and perhaps a slightly larger population. The impact of predatory gambling on society, however, goes far beyond in-casino heart attacks, The report ignores socio-economic impacts of pathological and problem gambling such as lowered productivity at work, administration of the justice system, “abused dollars” and social services. Outside those quantifiable costs are other costs too abstract to have a dollar value. Most are related  to problem and pathological gamblers, who yield about half the revenue of the average casino. These costs include family breakup, psychological hurt, and suicide. Casino promoters are not obliged to tell you about what they call “emotional” costs when they talk money but they should tell you that predatory gambling tolls society in estimatable dollars much more than the trifle Hudson Valley Casino concedes.

The application is mute on how many new problem gamblers and addicted gamblers a casino in Newburgh might generate, It gives not even an order of magnitude figure for the annual cost to society associated with each new problem or pathological gambler.  The only costs acknowledged due to gambling are for treatment and prevention. It is assumed that all foreseeable increases in these costs due to the casino would be covered by present Office of Alcohol and Substance Abuse Services programs plus an annual 1.5 million dollars to be collected by the state for treatment and prevention from 3000 gambling positions @$500/yr. The report writer must think this money would go back to Orange County dollar for dollar. Not so; it would be divvied up across the state.

The applicant is wrong to pretend that 1.5 million dollars would begin to cover the socio-economic costs attendant on a new casino in Newburgh.  Here is one estimate of the quantifiable socio-economic costs, neither best-case nor worst-case:

Within a fifty mile radius of the proposed site live at least 2.5 million adults. At least 1.14% (28,500) of them are pathological gamblers now [ Shaffer et al meta-analysis ref 1 ]. If the allure of a Newburgh casino were to notch up the 1.14% by just 15%, that’s 4275 new pathological gamblers. If the quantifiable socioeconomic cost per year of one pathological gambler is 12,790 dollars ( Grinols ref 2 ) the total cost for new pathological gamblers only (not counting problem gamblers) would be $54.7 million/year.

My attack on this proposal does not mean that I think there’s a proposal in Region 1 or anywhere in the state that has such a better analysis of societal health costs and benefits that it merits a license instead of Hudson Valley Casino.   A cost-benefit analysis that gave due regard to societal health would find that none of the sixteen proposals passes. The Upstate Gaming Act authorized up to four casinos in “upstate;” it did not mandate them. No proposed casino deserves a license.  Thank you.

The opinions expressed  are the speaker’s own and do not necessarily reflect those of any or all members of Coalition Against Gambling in New York .  Permission is granted to reproduce text or image in whole or part as long as the permalink above is cited.

Nowhere

Rainbow's end

Rainbow’s end

Nowhere

Most people assume that the New York State Gaming Commission has to award four new casino licenses in 2014 or 2015.  This assumption has made some individuals and groups in “regions eligible for gaming” hesitant to speak against particular proposals. They worry lest opposition in one place push the site selection to another locale no better suited. Think of the “Far Side” cartoon where a bear in the crosshairs points emphatically at another bear by his side.

It’s not true, however, that the Commission must sign off on four licenses. Coalition Against Gambling in New York (CAGNY) calls the attention of press and public to the fact that the Gaming Commission is not required to award even one casino license now or ever.  The passage of “Prop 1” in 2013 and its enabling legislation, the Upstate New York Gaming Economic Development Act of 2013, authorized the Gaming Commission to award up to four licenses “upstate.”   The law did not mandate a single one.

The law states (Title 1 §1300 ¶ 4) that “The state should authorize four destination resort casinos in upstate New York.”    Note the wording: “should” is used, not “shall,” “will” or “must.”

Further, in Title 2 §1311 the law reads : “The Commission is authorized to award up to four gaming facility licenses . . .”   Again, the language is permissive.

CAGNY observes that if the Gaming Commission has a green light from the legislature for up to four licenses, it also has the prerogative to award fewer. When the built-in drawbacks to casinos, like unchecked problem gambling, are compounded by the current fiscal woes of market saturation and leapfrogging interstate competition, not even one casino is called for. Columnist Fred Lebrun wrote thus of our state’s rush to expand casino gambling: “We’re embracing a corpse.”

Persons who speak against a particular proposal at the hearings on  September 22-24 2014  should make that point loud and clear. If someone asks “Supposing the proposal you’re fighting does not get a license, where should that license go?”   the reply is “Nowhere.”

 

 

Photo image “It’s just an illusion” from FlickrCC  4490566126_9ce7b24272

Permission to use this post  in whole or part is hereby granted  as long as the  permalink above is cited.  The opinions expressed are those of the writer, Stephen Q. Shafer MD MPH,  and are not necessarily shared by any or all members of Coalition Against Gambling in New York.

Caesars at Woodbury: Problem Gambling ? No Problem

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Summary: This is a critique of Attachment IX.A.2.a_A2  in  section  07 – IX.A. Assessment of Local Support and Mitigation Local Impact  of the  application by Caesars Entertainment to the New York State Gaming Facilities Location Board.    Being an epidemiologist and physician familiar with problem gambling as a public health problem,  I found  Attachment IX.A.2.a_A2  extremely biased in downplaying,  to near zero.  the possible health impacts  of a new Woodbury Casino.   The report asserts  as follows:

  • no socio-economic costs of pathological gambling and problem gambling warrant $ consideration, as none can be quantified so that all parties are close to agreement.
  • making casinos more convenient hardly  increases the prevalence of pathological gambling and problem gambling in the surrounding population in the long run.
  • the only population within a 50 mile radius of Woodbury that is  at theoretical  risk of having even a temporary surge in prevalence of pathological gambling and problem gambling  is that of Orange, Dutchess and Putnam Counties.
  • efforts by Caesars elsewhere to address “problem gambling” have been highly successful and will minimize “problem gambling” in southern New York State.

The  report greatly understates the possibility of harm to residents of the region due to a casino in Woodbury to residents of the region.  This essay addresses the first three  points in the above order.  The fourth  I have discussed in an e-mail to the NYS Gaming Commission last April.

 

In reading the Caesars Entertainment Inc application for a Woodbury casino I focused as a physician versed in public health  on the 40- page report   Study of Addiction and Public Health Implications of a Proposed Casino and Resort in Woodbury New York by Bo J. Bernhard Ph.D., Khalil Philander Ph.D., and Brett Abarbanel Ph.D.

The authors are all experienced consultants for gambling-related  enterprises. Two are senior members of the International Gaming Institute (IGI) at University of Nevada at Las Vegas. This is a highly polished presentation by experts who know the field but hide large tracts of it from view.   It  dismisses or never mentions four crucial facets of the ecology of pathological gambling and problem gambling. The report basically concludes that

  • socio-economic costs of pathological gambling and problem gambling don’t warrant consideration, as none can be quantified so that all parties are close to agreement.
  • making casinos more convenient does not much increase the prevalence of pathological gambling and problem gambling in the surrounding population in the medium  run of 2 to 4 years.
  • the only population within a 50 mile radius of Woodbury that is now under-served by racinos or casinos (and hence at theoretical  risk of having even a temporary surge in prevalence of pathological gambling and problem gambling) is that of Orange, Dutchess and Putnam Counties.
  • efforts by Caesars elsewhere to address “problem gambling” have been highly successful and can be relied on to minimize “problem gambling” in southern NY

The report nowhere mentions a statistic often cited by opponents of predatory gambling but never addressed head-on by casino advocates and never refuted: 40-50% of revenue at the average casino comes from pathological and problem gamblers, who comprise perhaps 12-15% of its customers, maybe 4% of all adults. [ http://cagnyinf.org/wp/april-9-2014-central-stat-of-casino-revenues] For the casino lobby to refute the statistic (if it is refutable) they would have to acknowledge that they can spot pathological and problem gamblers among their “visitors” while those persons are still active customers. This means before the person has loudly threatened suicide within an employee’s hearing or left town suddenly or thrown an ugly scene on the “gaming floor” or been arraigned or jumped.

Casinos will not acknowledge they have any  ability to spot problem or pathological gambling signs and symptoms that are not florid and end-stage. Why not? To move in even gently on such persons would risk offending them so they would go elsewhere or sending them to premature recovery before they have been “played to extinction.” [ https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9C2BPZYLW_U ] .  To recognize the problem gamblers before they are end-stage yet not do anything for them  would reveal how insincere are the “preventive measures.” .

The casino cartel does not deny that its net revenues follow the Pareto principle: most come from a small proportion of gamblers. What casino promoters won’t say is what proportion on the average of that small proportion are pathological gamblers or problem gamblers. The promoters just do not want to know who among their customers is a problem gambler or pathological gambler until the gambler hits bottom or worse.   Promoters and detractors alike recognize that not everyone who loses a lot of money over time at casinos is a problem gambler. Anti-casino activists hold that most are; the American Gaming Association counters that most are affluent people having fun with their disposable income.

Assuming the central statistic is close to truth, casinos are not motivated to sincerely counter problem gambling and pathological gambling.  A successful effort to do so would lower their revenues by 40-50%.  Nor is government motivated; lower casino gross gaming revenues   would reduce  government’s share  by a like amount.

The report prepared for Caesars (in this no different from all the literature on problem gambling) also does not recognize that “unchanging prevalence” of problem and pathological gambling requires the formation of replacement problem gamblers and pathological gamblers to fill the shoes of those who have recovered, died, moved far away or are no longer free-living. What might appear a steady state is built on creating new problem gamblers. The more effective  the casino is at encouraging current problem gamblers and pathological gamblers into lasting recovery before they have fiscally and emotionally wiped out themselves and and ten people around them, the faster it must generate replacement problem and pathological gamblers to keep up its high profit margins.

I will now cover the first three bullet points above in more detail. The fourth bullet point I wrote about in the above-mentioned letter to the Gaming Commission.

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Revenue Enhancement via Problem Gambling

Revenue Enhancement Via  Problem Gambling

2269211810_030e548987PHLSunrise

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

The operational approach of the NY State Legislature to problem gambling is horribly clear from the voting records on S7833 (passed 55 to 4 on June 20 2014) and the Assembly “same as” (A 10075 , Goldfeder sponsor) which  passed 119 to 9 on June 19.  The approach is to exploit problem gamblers, not help them recover.  The bill, not signed by the Governor yet,  allows racinos to close their  video lottery terminal (VLT) floors  at  6 AM instead of (previously) 4 AM.  It also  increases “free” play credits.   The memo is below in italics.

BILL NUMBER: S7833

SPONSOR: KLEIN
TITLE OF BILL: An act to amend the tax law, in relation to the

authorized hours of conducting video lottery gaming and the amount of

free play authorized therefor

PURPOSE OR GENERAL IDEA OF THE BILL:

The purpose of this bill is to enhance the revenues of video lottery

gaming facilities in New York.

SUMMARY OF PROVISIONS:

Section 1: Amends section 1617-a (b) of the tax law to allow video

lottery gaming facilities to operate until 6:00 a.m.

Section 2: Amends section 1617-a (f)(3) of the tax law to increase the

annual value of free play allowance credits authorized for use by a

video lottery gaming facility from ten to fifteen percent of the total

amount wagered on video lottery games after payout of prizes.

Section 3: The effective date.

JUSTIFICATION:

This bill is needed to provide incentive for individuals to visit the

video lottery gaming facilities in order for these facilities to enhance

revenues and attendance.

PRIOR LEGISLATIVE HISTORY:

This is new legislation.

FISCAL IMPLICATIONS FOR STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS:

None noted.

EFFECTIVE DATE: immediate

Comment by CAGNY editor: At 3:50 A.M. those racino VLT users who don’t want to stop at 4 o’clock are not the exhilarated, beaming young couples in racino advertisements. They are mostly problem gamblers and addicted gamblers who, if forced out at 4 A.M., would on the average leave less of the money they are using that morning than if they stayed until 6.  S 7833 was written deliberately to exploit that thin stratum of casino users (perhaps 12%) who provide about half the “net revenue” of the average casino.

Coalition Against Gambling in New York honors the insight and courage of the few legislators who voted NO.

 

The opinions expressed are those of the writer, Stephen Q. Shafer MD MPH and are not necessarily shared by any or all other members of CAGNY.  Permission is given hereby to quote or copy in whole or in part as long as the above permalink is cited.

The picture is from creative commons  2269211810_030e548987PHLSunrise.jpg

Whose Problem are Problem Gamblers ?

Central Statistic

Graphic by Dave Colavito, 2014 data from Grinols and Omorov 1996-97

On 24 April 2014  I sent to the Director for Policy,  Development and External Affairs of the NYS Gaming Commission the following  e-note with two attachments, one of which was   posted yesterday on the CAGNY web site below a copy of the April 24  cover e-note, repeated here.

Dear Sir,

Attached are two documents I earnestly hope the Chairman and all the Commissioners will read carefully and discuss with the  GFLB.  Both are about “problem gambling,” the subject of the April 9 forum convened by the Gaming Commission. Watching the videotape and reading the transcript (everyone should thank the GC for providing these so fast) I saw  that “problem gambling” was an elusive term.  The extreme importance to the casino economy of net losses from problem gamblers was nowhere mentioned except when the speaker from Caesars deflected  the issue.  Yet around the “central statistic of casino revenues,” on which I have written to the Commission, is the “central dilemma” of regulation: the better the regulation is at preventing problem gambling, the lower is the casinos’ profit margin.

Selected prevalence statistics were presented as if they are the be-all and the end-all of gambling behavior studies.  They are about all we have, but a poor stand-in for what we really want to know about time trends in social impacts, i.e.  incidence and duration.  Under the placid surface of what looks like stable prevalence,  much new damage continues; as problem gamblers recover or die, new ones must be recruited to take their places.

As I have offered before, I’m  [ready]  almost any time to meet with the Commissioners and staff to explain the critiques in more detail and to talk about “the central statistic.”

Thank you for your attention.

Sincerely, etc.

Stephen Q. Shafer, MD, MA,  MPH Chairperson, Coalition Against Gambling in New York 917 453 7371 http://cagnyinf.org  [ Cover note ends here]

 

No surprise,  the Commission has not responded to these  unsolicited comments. Does that mean the Commissioners have all accepted the assurances (see below) of  the Executive from Caesars Entertainment that the organization does not make money from “problem gamblers” and does ” not want them in [their] venues?”  If yes, it is a monumental  mistake.  I cannot speak for Caesars Entertainment in particular, but it would  be unique  if it does not make money from what most people call problem gamblers To  wrongly  assume Ms Shatley’s artful  discounting  of problem gamblers fits all casinos  would be an easy stretch  to make,  even if Caesars is unique. It would be worse yet if the attitude “casinos don’t want problem gamblers” were communicated to the Gaming Facilities Location Board members.  The GFLB is charged to consider plans by applicants to address problem gambling. The Board must understand how important problem gamblers are to the casino exchange.

Below is the text of the second attachment  that was sent to the Gaming Commission  on April 24, slightly revised.  The text of the other attachment sent the same day  was posted yesterday on this web site along with the cover e-note.

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“Replacement problem gamblers”

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On 24 April 2014  I sent to the Director for Policy,  Development and External Affairs of the NYS Gaming Commission the following  e-note with two attachments:

Dear Sir,

Attached are two documents I earnestly hope the Chairman and all the Commissioners will read carefully and discuss with the  GFLB.  Both are about “problem gambling,” the subject of the April 9 forum convened by the Gaming Commission. Watching the videotape and reading the transcript (everyone should thank the GC for providing these so fast) I saw  that “problem gambling” was an elusive term.  The extreme importance to the casino economy of net losses from problem gamblers was nowhere mentioned except when the speaker from Caesars deflected  the issue.  Yet around the “central statistic of casino revenues,” on which I have written to the Commission, is the “central dilemma” of regulation: the better the regulation is at preventing problem gambling, the lower is the casinos’ profit margin.

Selected prevalence statistics were presented as if they are the be-all and the end-all of gambling behavior studies.  They are about all we have, but a poor stand-in for what we really want to know about time trends in social impacts, i.e.  incidence and duration.  Under the placid surface of what looks like stable prevalence,  much new damage continues; as problem gamblers recover or die, new ones must be recruited to take their places.

As I have offered before, I am[ready]  almost any time to meet with the Commissioners and staff to explain the critiques in more detail and to talk about “the central statistic.”

Thank you for your attention.

Sincerely, etc.

Stephen Q. Shafer, MD, MA,  MPH Chairperson, Coalition Against Gambling in New York 917 453 7371 http://cagnyinf.org

To no one’s surprise,  the Commission has not responded to my unsolicited comments. Does that mean the Commissioners have all accepted  the ” adaptation hypothesis” [summarized in the next paragraph]   that  gambling expansion has  little long-term population impact?  If they have, ” this  was a grievous fault,”  but unless NYS media call them out  sharply  on it,  the Commission will not have to answer it grievously. If,  as I hope,  they have not bought it,  one sign will be that  the  Facilities Location Board  questions searchingly all applicants for a casino license on  what they will really do that will really  stop new cases of problem gambling.

Gentlemen of the Gaming Commission, how say you?

[Scientists from the Division on Addictions of the Cambridge Health Alliance have proposed an “adaptation hypothesis,” which acknowledges that new gambling opportunities may lead to a temporary increase in prevalence of problem gambling  for the surrounding population. Then, so goes the hypothesis, novelty fades,  individuals become more “responsible” in their gambling behaviors and  the crest subsides.]

One of the two attachments, slightly revised a month later,  is below. It begins with Summary.   It concerns the public health profile  of “problem gambling.”    The other, related to an operational definition of “problem gamblers”  and to their fiscal significance,  will soon be posted on the CAGNY web site.

Summary: “Problem gambling” is not a fixed uniform term. In his introduction to the April 9 forum on Problem Gambling, Dr. Gearan seems to take it, as I do, to mean both strata of gambling disorder combined, not just the less severe stratum often referred to as “problem gambling.” Statistics on the prevalence of “problem gambling” or its subgroup “pathological gambling” are often used to reassure policy-makers that gambling expansion has not worsened problem or pathological gambling. These statistics can be challenged on several grounds, but even if prevalence as a proportion of the population is truly unchanged in the long term, there are hundreds of thousands of new cases nationally hidden in it, millions of individuals affected. To keep prevalence stable there have to be new pathological gamblers brought on to take the place of those who died or entered recovery. Opponents of big tobacco use the term “replacement smokers.”  We extend this concept to “replacement” problem gamblers.   Tobacco companies need replacement smokers; society does not.  Casinos need replacement problem gamblers; society does not.  Quite the reverse.

Introduction  In the April 9th 2014 Problem Gambling forum hosted by the New York State Gaming Commission two speakers, Dr. Sarah Nelson and Ms Christine Reilly, used lack of change over time in “the prevalence of problem gambling”   to argue that expanded gambling opportunities do not increase endemic harms to public health. I will challenge that premise as an epidemiologist by digging into the population dynamics of “prevalence.”  With problem gambling, as with most chronic conditions, prevalence is more easily measured than the rate at which new cases develop. That does not mean it’s a perfectly valid marker of causation.  It hides new cases, the replacement problem gamblers that predatory gambling must endlessly cultivate to keep profits high.   To speak of the prevalence of “problem gambling” requires first defining the latter term. In the second and third sections of this narrative I will talk about the pitfalls of prevalence to assess “problem gambling” in a population.

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The Central Statistic of Casino Revenues

Central Statistic

The central statistic of  casino revenues gives the lie to assurances from casino promoters that they do not want, or need,   problem gamblers. In one line:

52 % of revenue at the average casino is the net losses of  “problem gamblers.”

The term “Problem gamblers”  as used above combines gamblers in two categories: what is now called “disordered gambling” (formerly called “pathological” or “addicted” or level 3); and those in what was formerly called “problem” or “subclinical pathological” or level 2).  There is no universally accepted name and unambiguous term for the combination, which was in the past termed by some “disordered gambling,”   by others “problem gambling.”  The combination  category is about  4 % of the adult population,   perhaps  10 to 15 %  of  casino users.  We recommend that “problem gambling” be kept as the portmanteau term for the combination.  We recommend that  persons whose lives are adversely affected by gambling but who do not meet  criteria for “disordered gambling” be called “at risk for disordered gambling.”

Nearly all the quantifiable socio-economic costs of legalized gambling,  more than $60 billion/year nationally ,2  move through this same 4 %  of adults who are “disordered”   or “at-risk-for-disordered” gamblers.   A program that reduced to zero the number of active disordered and at-risk gamblers and totally prevented formation of new ones would almost wipe away  the huge quantifiable socio-economic costs of legalized gambling, estimated at  $266 per year/capita adult  in the USA. 3

But,  that program would also reduce casino revenues by close on half.  Government’s share, based on taxing the total net losses of gamblers (“gross gaming revenue”), would drop by the same proportion.

The casino exchange exists only for profits.  Do you really think it would support in good faith a prevention and treatment program designed to cut its profit margin by half ?

Do you honestly think the state government would support in good faith a program whose complete success would mean a 50%  decrease in a budgeted revenue line?

Or, do you think the casino exchange and  government agencies would rather cooperate  to showcase  worthy  aims for “regulation” and “prevention  and treatment”  that might just fall short in practice ?

References

1.  Grinols, Earl L. and Omorow  J.D.  16  J. Law and Commerce 1996-97  p. 59 .  Details in appendix below.

2. The figure $60 billion comes from making low-side cost of living adjustments to convert 2003 dollars into those of 2012 and adjusting for population growth between 2003 and 2012.  The 2003 figures are on page 176-177 of Gambling in America by Earl L. Grinols (Cambridge University Press, 2004). This works out to about one-third the annual cost of illicit drug use.    https://www.drugfree.org/join-together/drugs/new-report-estimates-illicit-drug-use-costs-u-s-economy-more-than-193-billion-annually

3. http://cagnyinf.org/wp/gambling-economics-statistical-summary-by-prof-earl-grinols

Appendix:  What Proportion of Gamblers’ Net Losses to Casinos come from Problem Gamblers?  Brief  Review of  Five  Major Reports from the Last Twenty Years

Estimates of what proportion of casino gross gaming revenues derive from the approximately 4% of adults whose lives are adversely affected to varying degrees (“problem gamblers”) by gambling are not many.  The one most directly applicable to the average American casino is that of Grinols and Omorov.  Observations of  types of gambling other than physical casinos accord with Grinols and  Omorov in that  gamblers’ total net losses to a casino (also termed “gross gaming revenues”) have, like many other human activities, a Pareto distribution: the bulk of the output or the uptake   (e.g. consumption, volunteer work done) comes from a relative minority of the participants.

The casino exchange is wont to say that all such problem gambler statistics are wrong, that the biggest chunk of casino revenue is from wealthy “whales”  who  are not problem gamblers, just persons with a lot of discretionary spending money. That is all the rebuttal the exchange offers.

While “whales”  do exist, they do not frequent most casinos or racinos.  Casinos certainly have the information technology to respond with data to the above charges by opponents of predatory gambling, yet they do not.  To weigh in on this they would have to  acknowledge that they can identify all or most of the problem gamblers in their clientele.  This would open them to well-deserved criticism that they are not acting responsibly towards those persons.

Below, we review five documents related to the question of  % gambling revenues from problem gamblers, one each from United States, Alberta, Nova Scotia, Great Britain and Western Europe.

The next section, to the asterisks, is a continuous quote from page 59 of the article by E.L. Grinols and J.D. Omorov “Development or Dreamfield Delusions?: Assessing Casino Gambling’s Costs and Benefits.”  J. Law and Commerce vol. 16 (1996-1997) pp. 49-87.  The table has been re-formatted and footnotes removed.

“Table 1 provides a hypothetical profile of gambling revenues by type of gambler.

                           [table below]

Applying the terms “pathological” and “problem gambling” as

used by the psychology profession to the two groups losing the most to

casinos, we call those who have not gambled in a casino in the past year

“nonbettors,” and divide the remaining gamblers into “heavy” and

“light” bettor categories. Based on prevalence studies, we assume that

1.38 percent of the adults will be pathological gamblers  who lose an

average of $4,01328 and that problem gamblers lose one-seventh the

amount that pathological gamblers lose. This implies that 52 percent of

casino revenues come from the 4.11 percent of the population who are

pathological and problem gamblers.  In this respect, casino gambling resembles

alcohol of which 6.7 percent of the population consumes 50 percent

of all alcohol consumed. Allowing for the average adult to lose as

much as $200 annually to casinos in some areas would still mean that

more than 35 percent of casino revenues in those areas come from problem

and pathological gamblers.

 

The fact that the gambling industry is dependent on problem and

pathological gamblers for a large share of its revenues casts doubt on the

feasibility of treating pathological gamblers using industry tax revenues

to prophylactically prevent the externality costs of gambling addiction.

The treatment cost to the industry would be high, and these costs would

be in addition to existing taxes on gambling gross revenues that are already

high in many cases. Further, if treatment were successful in

preventing gambling by problem and pathological gamblers, it would significantly

reduce industry revenues. It is probably safe to conclude that

not everyone in the casino industry would willingly forego 35 percent or

more of their revenues.”  [emphasis added]

TABLE 1: Representative Distribution of Gambling Revenues by Type of Gambler

% of pop. designation annual loss annual loss cumul % of
per bettor $ per 100 adults $ casino gross
1.38 pathol. gambler 4013 5538 39
2.73 problem gambler 669 1826 52
5.89 heavy bettor 317 1866 65
50 light bettor 99 4970 100
40 non-bettor 0 0 0
100 total 14200 100

 

***********************************************************************

Figures in the table were computed by the authors  using information from  a 1992 report prepared by Deloitte  & Touche for the  City of  Chicago Gaming Commission:  ECONOMIC AND OTHER IMPACTS OF A PROPOSED GAMING. ENTERTAINMENT AND HOTEL FACILITY 137, 146, 147, 162

The Alberta study ( Williams et al)   two direct quotes

“ In 2008/2009 it is estimated that problem gamblers in Alberta account for 50% of all reported gambling expenditures, with that ratio being even higher for VLTs, slot machine and casino table games .”  Williams Robert J,  Belanger Yale, and Harris Jennifer N.  Gaming in Alberta  Final Report to the Alberta Gaming Research Institute 2011 p. 259

 

“A much more serious concern is that 75% of reported gambling expenditure comes from roughly 6% of the population. The most distinguishing feature of these individuals is the fact that 40.6% of them are problem gamblers. Overall, problem gamblers in 2008/2009 in Alberta appear to account for roughly 50% of all reported expenditure, a percentage that is even higher than previous Canadian estimates of between 23% – 36% (Williams & Wood, 2004; 2007). It is ethically problematic for governments and charity organizations to be drawing such a significant percentage of their revenue from a vulnerable segment of the population.”  [emphasis added]  Williams et al   op cit   Final Report to the Alberta Gaming Research Institute 2011 page 280

 

The Bwin study (Planzer, Gray and Howard Shaffer)

A study in Europe on internet gambling with casino type “games” authorized by the internet gaming company Bwin was reported on in an October 2013 article in the Wall Street Journal by Mark Maremont and Alexandra Berzon.   The investigators were Planzer,  Gray  and Howard Shaffer; their report is not yet published.  IThe WSJ article says that  3% of the 4222 customers tracked provided “half  the casino’s take.”  The  WSJ article did not say what proportion of the adult population the 3%  of the 4222 customers were.  Certainly it would be less than 3%, since only a minority of the adults do internet gambling.   The  article did not identify how many of the 3% were problem gamblers.  Safe guess it’s at least half.

Nova Scotia Video Lottery  (report by Focal Research)

A 470 page report on the Nova Scotia Lottery done by Focal Research [Schellink and Schrans principal authors] concluded that

“in 1997/98  5.7% of adults in Nova Scotia (approximately 38,750 adults) did most of the video lottery activity in the province and are contributing approximately $113,236,800, or approximately 96%, of the annual net revenue for video lottery gambling in the province.  Therefore, it can be assumed that VL   play behaviour differs significantly among those who are Casual VL Players and those who play on a regular, continuous basis and that these distinctions have significant implications, in terms of profiling VL gambling within the population at large.”

The Nova Scotia report (pages 3-42, 3-43) found that 55% of VL revenues were from “problem VL players,” who were about one-sixth  of the 5.75% of adults classed as “regular players” [defined as once a month or more].  Problem VL players thus comprised about .92% of adults.

The authors observe “It is obvious that success in helping Problem Players to reduce their expenditures will have a substantial impact on the total revenue Nova Scotia derives from VL play. If  Problem Players’ expenditure was similar to that noted for Frequent Players, there would be a reduction in total revenues from VL gambling of approximately 35% to 40%.

Using  the 2010 British Gambling Prevalence Survey, James Orford (Univ Birmingham), Heather Wardle and Mark Griffiths derived a lower figure for % of gamblers’ net losses coming from problem gamblers: 23% at FOBTs [Fixed Odds Betting Terminals].  We note, however, that the prevalence of current problem gambling in this survey (0.9% by DSM –IV and 0.7% by PGSI criteria)  was much lower than the 2-4% figures from elsewhere.  This difference is more likely to be due to methods than to Britons’ being less vulnerable.  In this study, then,  23% of the FOBT revenues come from less than 1% of the adult population.  This ratio is even more skewed than what what Grinols and Omorov reported for “the average casino” (52% from 4%) .

The opinions expressed above are those of the writer,  Stephen Q. Shafer  MD, MPH, MA retired Clinical Professor of Neurology at Harlem Hospital Center, Columbia University , New York City.  He is Chairperson of Coalition Against Gambling in New York, a non-profit registered in Buffalo  http://cagnyinf.org    Permission is hereby given to quote in whole or in part as long as the permalink is cited and all citations to other work are correctly conveyed.

The graphic is by Dave Colavito.  He places no restrictions on use  but please attribute work to him.